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Abstract
This paper looks at peer review as a cooperation dilemma through a game-theory frame-
work. We built an agent-based model to estimate how much the quality of peer review is
influenced by different resource allocation strategies followed by scientists dealing with
multiple tasks, i.e., publishing and reviewing. We assumed that scientists were sensitive to
acceptance or rejection of their manuscripts and the fairness of peer review to which they
were exposed before reviewing. We also assumed that they could be realistic or exces-
sively over-confident about the quality of their manuscripts when reviewing. Further-
more, we assumed they could be sensitive to competitive pressures provided by the
institutional context in which they were embedded. Results showed that the bias and
quality of publications greatly depend on reviewer motivations but also that context
pressures can have a negative effect. However, while excessive competition can be
detrimental to minimising publication bias, a certain level of competition is instrumental to
ensure the high quality of publication especially when scientists accept reviewing for
reciprocity motives.
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Introduction
Today, science is characterised by a ‘‘publish or perish’’ mentality due to growing com-
petition for funds and academic job uncertainty (Edwards and Siddhartha 2017; Grimes
et al. 2018). This context can undermine the objectivity and integrity of research as sci-
entists could be induced to produce ‘‘publishable’’ results at all costs, thereby also putting
journal editors and reviewers in a difficult position (Fanelli 2010; Marusˇic´ et al. 2013;
Tijdink et al. 2014; D’Andrea and O’Dwyer 2017; Sarigo¨l et al. 2017; Bravo et al. 2018).
Furthermore, the lack of robust positive and negative incentives for peer review (Hauser
and Fehr 2007; Aktipis and Thompson-Schill 2010; Squazzoni et al. 2013) makes coop-
eration between editors, reviewers and authors extremely sensitive to external institutional
conditions, e.g., competition pressures. Such a context seems to conspire against the
quality and sustainability of peer review as rewards are for publishing, not for reviewing
(Tennant et al. 2017).
In an influential contribution, Merton (2000 [1942]) suggested that science developed an
institutional system that socialised scientists as members of a community towards robust
and socially shared standards of conduct, social norms and values. He suggested that these
ethical standards were intrinsic to the very idea of a scientific community in the modern
sense of the word. He claimed that, although potentially ambiguous, these standards were
instrumental to induce scientists to maintain the quality of science as a public good by
means of a complex balance between incentives to collaborate and incentives to compete
for recognition and prestige. He also suggested that the social organisation of scientific
inquiry was context-dependent given that as science became more institutionalized, it also
became ‘‘more intimately interrelated with the other institutions of society’’ (Merton 2000
[1942], p. 200). While discussing the diversity of scientist motivations, he suggested that:
assumption of a single motive is of course unsound. [...] Scientific inquiry, like
human action generally, stems from a variety and amalgam of motives in which the
passion for creating new knowledge is supported by the passion for recognition by
peers and the derivate competition for place [...]. Any extrinsic rewards – fame,
money, position – is morally ambiguous and potentially subversive of culturally
esteemed values. [...] An excess of incentives can produce distracting conflict. But
when the institution of science works effectively (and, like other social institutions, it
does not always do so), recognition and esteem accrue to those scientists who have
best fulfilled their roles, to those who have made fundamental contributions to the
common stock of knowledge. (Merton 2000 [1942], p. 218)
Just as science was interrelated ‘‘with the other institutions of society’’ in the Mertonian
era, in which government agencies were developing big science programmes, public funds
were generous and academic institutions were expanding, so is science interrelated to
institutions today. Recent research suggests that the current institutional incentive structure
tends to trigger competitive spirits of scientists and pay-off preferably certain activities
(e.g., publications, citations and grants). This implies that scientists need to strategise
resource allocation (Fang and Casadevall 2015). Strategising here means rationally allo-
cating scarce resources towards more rewarding activities, e.g., publications, grant pro-
posals or lobbying for academic career. This means disinvesting to less rewarding ones,
e.g., reviewing (Righi and Taka´cs 2017).
Therefore, peer review can be influenced by a variety of exogenous change pressures,
including technology and political demands of public accountability (see Peres-Neto 2016;
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Csiszar 2016). Furthermore, normative tension can occur between the multifaceted pri-
orities of individual scientists (i.e., high publication and citation scores, big grants, con-
sideration and peer esteem) and the real priority of the scientific community, i.e., scientific
knowledge development. Although intrinsic to scientific community since the Mertonian
era, this misalignment between individual priorities and collective interests has intensified
today due to institutional pressure on competition and increasing uncertainty for funding
and careers (Balietti et al. 2016).
It is worth noting that social dilemmas, where pay-offs of individuals are at odds with
collective achievements, has been examined comprehensively by game theory-influenced
experimental and behavioural science (see Fehr and Gintis 2007; Bravo and Squazzoni
2013). Research suggests that the alignment of individual and collective interests is pos-
sible whenever certain informal or formal enforcement options have been developed, such
as positive incentives (e.g., rewards), negative incentives (social or institutional punish-
ment), or when formal organisations or bureaucracy exist that help to coordinate individual
behaviour towards socially desirable outcomes (Bowles 2016).
The problem here is that these mechanisms either do not exist or are weakly present in
peer review. Peer review is a form of volunteer cooperation that involves academic
community members who are called on to decide whether to contribute to a public good,
while simultaneously having different priorities and pressures (see Northcraft and Ten-
brunsel 2011). These priorities can determine the type of effort scientists eventually decide
to allocate to reviewing, which might even vary from time to time and from scientist to
scientist (see Leek et al. 2011).
Unfortunately, a few previous studies have seriously looked at peer review as a
cooperation dilemma with experimental protocols and models that were inspired by game
theory. For instance, Leek et al. (2011) performed an online game experiment on author-
reviewer cooperation in open and closed peer review. The results showed that when
reviewer behaviour was made public under open review, cooperation significantly
increased as reviewers could be rewarded for reviewing. Squazzoni et al. (2013) designed
an adapted version of a repeated investment game by adding reviewers who rated authors
(trustees) to benefit editors (investors) and manipulated reviewer incentives. They found
that cooperation increased and fairness equilibria were more likely to be achieved when
reviewers were not materially incentivised. Garcı´a et al. (2015c) proposed an adverse
selection model based on agency theory to examine strategic interaction between journal
editors and reviewers according to which reviewers were seen as ‘‘agents’’ of journal
editors (their ‘‘principals’’). They tested the implications of unobservability of reviewer’s
expertise from the editor’s perspective and the ambiguity of review’s complexity, which
can be precisely estimated only by the reviewer. Their simulation results suggested that
bias was reduced when reputational rewards for reviewers were established as this stim-
ulated talented reviewers to contribute, thereby helping editors in matching the complexity
of manuscripts and the reviewers’ expertise more efficiently. Similarly, Garcı´a et al.
(2015a) looked at the relationship between reviewers’ effort and bias to understand optimal
journal strategies of associate editor assignment and reviewer selection that could reduce
potential bias (see also Cabota` et al. 2014), while Garcı´a et al. (2015b) examined the
potentially positive role of editor bias as a signal to match authors and journal of similar
quality standards and so create heterogeneity of outlets.
These contributions were mainly concerned with identifying strategies and policies that
could promote cooperation between editors and reviewers, beneficial to the quality of
science as a public good (Righi and Taka´cs 2017). Here, on the other hand, we aimed at
looking in detail at the conflict between different options that scientists could take to solve
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an individual trade-off problem, i.e., how much resources they should allocate to multiple
tasks under scarcity constraints. Furthermore, we were not concerned with finding optimal
solutions to the game. Rather, we wanted to understand potential implications of scientist
behaviour on aggregate system’s behaviour.
We first looked at an iterated version of a cooperation game between authors and
reviewers in which, for the sake of simplicity, editors were synthesised in a final editorial
decision of manuscripts’ acceptance or rejection, which was based only on reviewer
opinion. We hypothesised that scientists could react adaptively to circumstances (i.e.,
publication success or failure) and estimate the fairness of peer review to which they were
previously exposed. We also hypothesised that scientists could be realistic or excessively
over-confident on the quality of their manuscripts. Finally, we tested the impact of com-
petitive pressure from the institutional context. Our manipulations were intended to esti-
mate the impact of these behavioural factors on the quality and efficiency of peer review,
which were measured in terms of publication bias, wasted author investment and reviewing
expense at a system level, following previous work by Squazzoni and Gandelli
(2012, 2013), Cabota` et al. (2013) and Bianchi and Squazzoni (2016). In order to add
behavioural realism to the model, we implemented a game-theoretic framework in an
agent-based model (ABM), which allowed us to understand the sensitivity of aggregate
outcomes to variation and heterogeneity of scientist behaviour (Thurner and Hanel 2011;
Allesina 2012; Squazzoni and Gandelli 2012; Cabota` et al. 2013; Paolucci and Grimaldo
2014; Kovanis et al. 2016, 2017; Righi and Taka´cs 2017).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. ‘‘The PRG model’’ section presents the
peer review game (PRG, from now on) model and briefly estimates certain analytical
predictions on a simple version of the game. ‘‘The PRG agent-based model’’ section
illustrates the set of scientist strategies that we tested with an ABM of the game. It is worth
noting that while analytic game predictions can fully inform us about expected outcomes of
peer review if scientists were all fully rational and self-interested, simulating the game with
complex combinations of scientist behaviour and interaction effects was pivotal in
understanding different aggregate outcomes (see Squazzoni and Taka`cs 2011). ‘‘Results’’
section presents our simulation results, while ‘‘Discussion and conclusions’’ section
summarises our key findings and discusses limitations and possible developments of our
work.
The PRG model
Model overview
The PRG is a repeated game where n scientists were assigned the task of producing
manuscripts for publication and reviewing. At each repetition, each scientist i played the
game as author and referee simultaneously, by submitting a manuscript and reviewing
another one. Each review provided a recommendation based on the estimated quality of the
manuscript.
In order to perform their tasks, scientists were endowed with a given amount of
resources Ri. Although a variety of resources are typically needed to perform these tasks
(e.g., laboratory equipment, a team of collaborators, etc.), for the sake of simplicity, we
assumed that Ri was the time that each scientist i decided to devote to these tasks in a given
period, say a month. We assumed that a fixed overall amount of resource R ¼Pni¼1 Ri was
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available in the scientific community and that R was shared among all scientists following
an arbitrary distribution.
Before each game, scientists had to decide how much resources to allocate to (1)
produce manuscripts and (2) provide reviews of others according to a trade-off that
mimicked availability of time as a given constraint. The allocation choice of scientists
depended on a parameter that defined their submission effort ei 2 ½0; 1, which represented
the share of resources used by each scientist to produce a manuscript. The quality of each
scientist i’s manuscript depended on their level of resources and effort:
Qsi ¼ eiRi ð1Þ
while the quality of their review depended on the amount of resources that was left after
producing the manuscript:
Qri ¼ Ri  Qsi ¼ ð1 eiÞRi: ð2Þ
Following Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012, 2013) and Bianchi and Squazzoni (2016), we
assumed that reviews were always error-prone, which means that the actual quality of a
manuscript could be only approximately recognised by a reviewer. The estimated quality
of a manuscript was calculated as:
Q^si ¼ ajQsi ð3Þ
with aj that was drawn from a normal distribution having l ¼ 1 and
r ¼ T minðT;Qrj Þ, where j was the reviewer and T was a quality threshold which
estimated the minimum amount of resources (i.e., time) needed by each j to provide a fair
review, i.e., a review that reflected at best the true quality of the manuscript. This meant
that the closer Qrj was to T
, the fairer the review was. In addition, the review acknowl-
edged the true quality of the manuscript 8Qrj T. The T parameter reflected the diffi-
culty of the review process in terms for instance, of time needed to provide a fair review to
the manuscript.
Once the estimated quality of all manuscripts was assigned by the reviewers, a fixed
proportion P of manuscripts was selected for publication on its basis, i.e., following Q^si
ranking. Finally, the publication record (pi) of scientists whose manuscripts were published
was increased by one unit.
Every m rounds of repetitions, resources were redistributed proportionally to the sci-
entists’ publication record. The new Ri was calculated as R by the ratio between the size of
i’s publication record and the total number of manuscripts produced by all scientists in the
game until the current round as follows:
Ri ¼ piPn
i¼1 pi
R: ð4Þ
After resources were redistributed, a new round of the game started that used updated Ri
and pi values.
The overall rationale of the model was that scientists competed for publication but were
also members of public research agencies or universities, which could not fire them.
Considering that time was equal to resources, Eq. 4 implied that successful scientists were
likely to devote even more time to instrumental scientific activities, e.g., preparation of
grant proposals and management of large scientific teams. On the other hand, unsuccessful
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scientists could end up with a Ri value that was close to zero and they were likely to
allocate more time to teaching or administrative tasks.
Equilibrium dynamics
We first studied the PRG analytically in a simplified 2 2 version. Here, we assumed that
the game was played by two scientists who could choose between high or low effort in
preparing manuscripts to submit fHs; Lsg and reviewing fHr; Lrg. Being the reviewing
effort 1 ei, scientists could not simultaneously play Hs and Hr. This meant that only two
possible strategies were possible, i.e., ðHs; LrÞ and ðLs;HrÞ. We assumed that, if a reviewer
played high effort in reviewing (i.e., Hr), a high effort by the author to prepare the
manuscript (Hs) always led to the publication of the manuscript (probability of publication
p ¼ 1), while an author’s low effort strategy to prepare the manuscript (Ls) always led to
manuscript rejection (p ¼ 0). If a reviewer played a low effort strategy (Lr)—e.g., by
providing excessively positive, or negative reviews or not so informative reports—the
acceptance of the manuscript was determined by chance alone, with p ¼ 0:5 independently
of the author’s strategy. This led to a matrix payoff as in Table 1. Note that payoffs for the
referees were always equal to zero, as we assumed that reviewing did not increase the
change of publication.
Given that in each round players played both authors and referees and given the lim-
itations in the choice of strategies discussed above, the combined payoff matrix takes the
form showed in Table 2.
This situation did not change even if the number of scientists were higher or continuous
effort choices were introduced. In general, the probability of publication for each scientist
i 2 f1; . . .; ng was an increasing function of the individual submission effort ei but a
decreasing one of the average effort of all other scientists e ¼ ðPj6¼i ejÞ=ðn 1Þ. This was
because Qsi increased with ei but there was an inverse relation between the amount of
resources that were allocated to produce and submit papers and the randomness in the
publication selection process.
Nevertheless, at least for low T values, unfair equilibria could be reduced such that
some scientists could accept a minimal amount of unfairness by holding a ei small enough
to guarantee Qri  T in a situation where others invested all their resources to try to be
published. This meant that unfair equilibria could be less robust here than in the 2 2
game. Another possible solution to the dilemma is that scientists with very high Ri could
invest a small part of their resources to provide Qri  T, as this would not significantly
decrease the probability that their manuscripts would be published. In these ‘‘Olsonian’’
Table 1 Authors’ payoffs in the simplified 2 2 PRG
Payoffs are expressed as probability of acceptance of the manuscript
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(Olson 1965) cases, a public-good fair peer review could be at least partially provided even
assuming that scientists were all similarly fully rational, i.e., selfishly maximising their
chances of being published.
The PRG agent-based model
In this extended version of the game,1 we hypothesised various behavioural strategies by
scientists and manipulated the institutional setting in which they were embedded. For
‘‘behavioural strategies’’, we meant resource allocation decision rules that the scientists
could follow while managing the trade-off between investing in their manuscripts or
reviewing. While considering simple behavioural rules as a limitation, it is actually
questionable whether scientists, like all humans, would be able to compute complex game
equilibria in a situation of repeated games with multiple players. Here, following beha-
vioural game theory, we used a game-theory framework less deductively and more
inductively. By ‘‘institutional setting’’, we meant a particular set of incentives provided by
science policies or market forces, which frame and constrain scientist behaviour (Squaz-
zoni et al. 2013).
The first sub-section presents a set of adaptive strategies of resource allocation that
considered a mix of motivations. For instance, scientists may maximise their chances of
being published but could also accept reviewing to intentionally maintain robust quality
standards. Vice versa, they could accept reviewing more maliciously to use their position
to penalise other manuscripts, even at their own expenses, e.g., time to read and review a
manuscript. This is what has typically been observed in behavioural experiments (Fehr and
Gintis 2007; Balietti et al. 2016).
In an initial set of scenarios, we assumed that scientists constantly revised their allo-
cation decision by adaptively reacting to previous acceptance or rejection of their manu-
scripts. Indeed, being published or rejected in a round could induce scientists to invest
more on the quality of their manuscripts to subsequently increase their publication chances.
Furthermore, they could accept reviewing to reciprocate good reviews they received in the
past as authors with good reviews in turn, or vice versa, to intentionally punish other
scientists who they consider to be indirectly responsible for bad standards of peer review
they were previously victims of (Squazzoni and Gandelli 2013).
In a second set of scenarios, we assumed that instead of simply reacting to previous
publication success or failure, scientists could estimate whether they truly deserved to be
accepted or rejected by comparing the quality of their manuscripts to the overall quality of
Table 2 Combined payoff matrix in the 2 2 PRG
In each round, players play as both authors and referees
1 A NetLogo (Wilensky 1999) version of the model can be accessed at https://www.comses.net/codebases/
6b77a08b-7e60-4f47-9ebb-6a8a2e87f486/releases/1.0.0/.
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published manuscripts. Here, previous simulation results showed that reciprocity strategies
of scientists could reduce publication bias only when scientists considered the fairness of
the process rather than the outcome (Squazzoni and Gandelli 2013).
In the last subsection, we tested the same strategies by assuming that scientists were
exposed to an institutional context that triggered their ‘‘strive for excellence’’ competitive
spirits. In this case, we hypothesised that scientists could estimate the quality of their
manuscripts against the quality of the top published manuscripts as though they were
pressured by academic institutions to get published only in top journals. Here, we also
tested whether scientists, by being exposed to competitive pressures, could be subject to
over-confidence and examined whether this was beneficial or detrimental to the quality of
peer review and publication (Johnson and Fowler 2011).
Scientist behavioural strategies
This section presents all the strategies followed by scientists in the PRG model. Each has
been tested separately in different simulation scenarios. Under all strategies, the scientists
varied the proportion of resources invested in either preparing their own manuscripts or
reviewing other manuscripts by increasing or decreasing their investment in submission by
a constant quantity De. Note that scientists could not play high-effort strategies in both
roles simultaneously, as resource allocation decision was constrained by scarcity (Eqs. 1,
2).
The selfish scientist
Behavioural findings suggested that selfishness does not dominate completely in any
human society, otherwise we would have not seen all the complex forms of cooperation
that have been developed over time, including peer review. However, selfishness is part of
human nature and must be contemplated even when examining scientist behaviour. Recent
cases of misconduct and fraud in science indicate that under certain conditions, scientists
could also behave rationally and selfishly to the detriment of others, including the public
image and prestige of the scientific community (Bar-Ilan and Halevi 2017). At each time
step t, we assumed that scientists selfishly maximised their probability of being published
by increasing their ei up to 1, independently of previous publication success or failure at
step t  1. This strategy follows the dominant strategy of the simplified PRG (Table 1) and
was used as a baseline to examine the following.
The equaliser scientist
Here, we assumed that scientists systematically allocated their resources preferably
towards preparing manuscripts even when they were previously published. However, when
previously rejected, they decreased their ei to invest more in reviewing submissions by
other scientists. Indeed, scientists can react to publication failure by both attempting to
punish other scientists through detailed reviews in case they deserve to be rejected or to
promote others who deserve it, as a means of making peer review work better.
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The reciprocating scientist
Here, we assumed that scientists were interested to have their manuscripts published but
also had an intrinsic interest in contributing to the quality of peer review by providing
accurate reviews. Behavioural experiments suggest that in many situations, individuals are
willing to reduce their individual pay-offs to benefit others as a way either to reciprocate
good behaviour or to punish wrongdoers (Fehr and Schmidt 2006). Therefore, we assumed
that scientists invested resources on submissions until they had their manuscript published.
They then reciprocated their success by reviewing other submissions. This meant that in
each time step t, agents increased their level of ei if their submission at t  1 was pub-
lished, otherwise they decreased ei.
Note that no pure altruist strategy (i.e., agents always decreasing their submission
effort) was tested, because empirical evidence suggests that any form of altruism that is not
sensitive to concrete conditions—e.g., other behaviour—is rare. In general, evolutionary
studies show that the infrequency of this type of behaviour was key for the emergence of
cooperation. Indeed, only the presence of forms of conditional or strong cooperation has
helped reduce the proliferation of selfish behaviour and so create conditions for social
order, including robust norms and institutions (Gintis 2009; Bowles 2016). However, it
may be the case of certain scientists who are not pressured by any scientific performance
indicators, as being evaluated mostly on other issues (e.g., teaching or administrative
duties), who intensely invest resources on reviewing also to receive updated information on
scientific progress.
Institutional settings
In a baseline scenario, we assumed that agents were not embedded in an institutional
setting which exposed them to certain rewards and influences. However, scientists are
embedded in such contexts in that their perceptions and behaviour could reflect certain
characteristics of the environment, e.g., competition, rankings and high-quality publication
standards. It is also likely that these forces reverberate on peer review, which is not an
institutionally isolated mechanism (Squazzoni et al. 2013; Kovanis et al. 2016; Tennant
et al. 2017).
Here, we tested equaliser and reciprocating scientists to find whether they could react
not only to previous publication success or failure but also to the fairness of the peer review
process. We assumed that scientists correctly estimated the quality of their manuscripts and
the reviewer opinion by comparing the quality of their submission (Qsi ) with the value of C.
This parameter was set to a threshold value of a percentile of the distribution of Qs between
published manuscripts. Scientists perceived that reviewers were fair if Qsi C in case of
publication of their submission or if Qsi\C in case of rejection.
We then assumed that equaliser scientists increased their investment in submissions if
they perceived to be treated fairly by reviewers, as we assumed their confidence in the
process to be reinforced as long as they perceived that peer review worked correctly.
Otherwise, they relaxed their effort in publishing and increased their investment on
reviewing.
Finally, reciprocating scientists reacted to the perceived fairness of the peer review
system by increasing their effort in reviewing. They therefore decreased their ei only if
they were evaluated fairly, while they increased it to react to the low quality of peer review
by focusing on their own priorities.
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‘‘Strive for publication’’ versus ‘‘strive for excellence’’
In order to test different kinds of institutional setting, we compared the effects of both
equalizer and reciprocating strategies by changing the C threshold parameter value that
agents used to evaluate the fairness of peer review. We assumed that agents could correctly
assess the quality of each published paper and compare the quality of their own submission
(Qsi ) with either the third or the first quartile of the published papers. In the first case (strive
for publication) agents used a relatively low standard as a proxy to assess whether their
submission or rejection was fairly decided. On the contrary, in the latter case, the situation
resembled a scenario where scientists strive for excellence.
Over-confidence bias
Furthermore, we assumed that scientists fell into an over-confidence trap in that they
systematically overestimated the quality of their manuscripts when comparing the quality
of other published manuscripts. It is worth noting that the over-confidence bias is pre-
dictably higher when individuals have high confidence of their own opinion, which may
not be so rare among scientists who have invested years of research on a given theory or
finding (see Pallier et al. 2002; Chambers and Windschitl 2004). However, given that
scientists should be proof seekers, empiricist individuals in the first place, we assumed that
they were only minimally over-confident in that they perceived that the quality of their
manuscripts was only 10% higher than what it actually was.2
Simulation design
We ran computer simulations of the model by combining different behavioural strategies
and institutional settings on a total of 11 scenarios. Table 3 shows the model parameters.
The T parameter was set at 6, meaning that we assumed that performing a review with
minimal required quality took 6 hours. While we chose not to report simulation outcomes
with extreme T values because they were not realistic, it is worth noting that these values
(T ¼ f4; 5; 7; 8g) did not generate significantly different results. However, the ‘‘Ap-
pendix’’ reports sensitivity analysis with other T values. Finally, we also chose to run
simulations by assuming uniform distributions of R and e. This was to focus our analysis
on the effect of the manipulated behavioural and institutional settings. The ‘‘Appendix’’
reports robustness tests with various initial parameter distributions.
Following Squazzoni and Gandelli (2012, 2013) and Bianchi and Squazzoni (2016), we
assessed the outcome of the simulated peer review process by measuring bias in manu-
script selection and quality of published manuscripts.
At the end of each simulation run, n  P ¼ 125 manuscripts were published. First, we
calculated the evaluation bias as the percentage of rejected manuscripts among those 125
manuscripts with the highest Qsi values, i.e. the proportion of incorrectly rejected manu-
scripts on the total amount of published articles. We then calculated the publication quality
as the average Qs value among the published manuscripts. Finally, we estimated the top
quality as the average Qs value among the top 10 published manuscripts ranked by Qs.
2 Simulations with higher levels of the over-confidence rate did not yield significantly different results.
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Results
Results were obtained by running 100 repetitions of the model for each combination of
behavioural strategies and institutional settings. For each repetition, the model was run for
500 steps. At the end of each repetition, we calculated the cumulative moving average
values of evaluation bias, publication quality, and top quality based on the last 100 runs.
Finally, we averaged the results on the total number of repetitions.
Figure 1 shows average dynamics of evaluation bias with different behavioural
strategies in each institutional setting. In each scenario, the system reached an equilibrium
after nearly 350 runs.
Table 4 shows evaluation bias in each scenario. The second column (no comparison)
shows different behavioural strategies when agents reacted only to the outcome of their
past submissions. When scientists were selfishly interested only in their own publications’
success (selfish), 57.61% of papers of sufficient quality for publication were rejected.
Therefore, in the baseline scenario (see ‘‘Scientist behavioural strategies’’ section) the
allocation of manuscripts was approximately random. When we assumed that scientists
increased their effort in reviewing only in case they were rejected as authors (equaliser),
the average evaluation bias dropped to approximately one third of manuscripts. Otherwise,
by assuming that scientists increased their reviewing effort in case they were previously
published and decreased it otherwise, we obtained the worst result, with evaluation bias
peaking at 66.91%.
Tables 5 and 6 show the effect of behavioural strategies and institutional settings on the
quality of publications. When considering no comparison, we found that publication
quality and top quality were sensitive to behavioural strategies and evaluation bias (see
Table 4). In general, by assuming that agents did not compare their own publication
outcomes with others, the equaliser strategy generated the lowest bias and the highest
overall quality. Figure 1 shows that the outcome was due to agents generally concentrating
their resources preferentially on submissions. This produced relatively low levels of bias
and high quality. However, this depended on the level of reviewing efforts: where these
were low, bias stabilised around a fairly low level, so generating the second-highest
published quality value across all scenarios. On the other hand, by assuming reciprocating
strategies, agents decreased their submission efforts and this reflected on the average low
quality of submissions, eventually making submissions more vulnerable to misjudgment
due to reviewers’ perception bias. The symmetric increase in reviewing effort did not
compensate low submission quality, so generating an equilibrium with high bias and low
overall quality.
Table 3 Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
n 500
Steps 500
Distribution of e Uniform
Distribution of R Uniform
T 6
De 0.05
P 0.25
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Results changed significantly when we assumed that agents adjusted their efforts on the
basis of the average published papers’ quality (strive for publication). In this case, the
effect of scientists’ strategies on evaluation bias was reversed. Bias generated by the
equaliser strategy increased to 40.56%, while the assumption of a reciprocating strategy
significantly decreased it, so generating the least overall bias in this setting (27.86%).
b Fig. 1 Evolution of evaluation bias over time for each institutional setting (results averaged over 100
repetitions for each scenario). a No comparison, b strive for publication—objective self-evaluation, c strive
for publication—overconfident self-evaluation, d strive for excellence—objective self-evaluation, e strive
for excellence—overconfident self-evaluation
Table 4 Average evaluation bias (%) in all simulation scenarios
Behavioural
strategy
No comparison Institutional setting
Strive for publication Strive for excellence
Objective Overconfidence Objective Overconfidence
Selfish 57.61
Equaliser 32.71 40.56 29.47 62.79 58.01
Reciprocating 66.91 27.86 28.05 30.66 27.04
Table 5 Average publication quality in all simulation scenarios (normalized values ranging 0–1)
Behavioural
strategy
No comparison Institutional setting
Strive for publication Strive for excellence
Objective Overconfidence Objective Overconfidence
Selfish 0.60
Equaliser 0.98 0.71 0.85 0.44 0.49
Reciprocating 0.41 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.36
Table 6 Average publication quality of top 10 published papers in all simulation scenarios (normalized
values ranging 0–1)
Behavioural
strategy
No comparison Institutional setting
Strive for publication Strive for excellence
Objective Overconfidence Objective Overconfidence
Selfish 0.51
Equaliser 0.91 0.94 1.00 0.75 0.83
Reciprocating 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.34
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However, the equaliser strategy produced a high publication quality—although less than in
the previous setting—, while the reciprocating strategy provided the worst average quality
across all scenarios. This was because equaliser agents were less likely to allocate
resources on reviewing than in the no comparison setting. Low-quality reviews in turn, had
a negative impact on the average quality of published papers, because a significant amount
of high-quality papers were unfairly rejected. Interestingly, overall high submission efforts
produced some very high-quality papers, which were not vulnerable to biased reviews.
This explains why top quality increased. On the other hand, Fig. 1 shows that recipro-
cating agents’ tendency to allocate their efforts more fairly initially eliminated any bias.
This later increased though minimally when biased rejections induced agents to decrease
their reviewing efforts. Yet, overall unbalanced resource allocation on reviewing produced
the worst average quality of published papers across all scenarios.
The assumption of agents’ over-confidence mitigated the impact of strategies on eval-
uation bias but generated significantly different quality outcomes. This was because
equaliser agents were more likely to perceive that their rejected papers were higher quality
than the published ones. Therefore, they started to devote more efforts on reviewing, which
eventually lowered the overall bias. However, a small amount of agents rarely experienced
rejections in the first period of the simulation, eventually achieving the highest levels of
submission quality. This subset of agents generated the highest top quality result across all
scenarios. This compensated other agents’ lower submission efforts and kept publication
quality relatively high together with low evaluation bias.
A similar relationship between the two strategies can be observed in terms of eval-
uation bias when we assumed that scientists compared the publication outcome of their
own submission with the average quality of the top 10 published papers (strive for
excellence). Bias generated by both strategies increased, with equaliser strategy gener-
ating more than twice the bias of reciprocating strategy, rejecting on average 62.79%
high-quality submissions. However, the relationship reversed if we consider results in
publication quality. While this decreased among equaliser agents as compared to the
other institutional settings (0.44), reciprocating agents performed the best results across
all scenarios. This setting amplified the negative impact of equaliser strategies on the
overall bias, because it made agents even less likely to react to an incorrect rejection by
increasing their reviewing efforts than in the other settings. This yielded an overall high
bias, eventually generating a drop in the average quality. Following these results, top
quality was less affected by this negative effect. Reciprocating agents however were
more likely to shift resources towards reviewing because they perceived they had
deserved rejections. Moreover, some of them submitting high quality manuscripts could
consider rejections as biased, so further increasing their efforts in submissions. This
created an average high quality of published papers, among which top 10 scored one of
the highest results across all scenarios (0.93). Interestingly, when we assumed over-
confidence, the probability of perceiving a rejection as incorrect was so high that the
overall high reviewing effort by reciprocating agents depressed publication quality
(0.36).
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Discussion and conclusions
If we consider resource allocation strategies of scientists as if they were not embedded in
any institutional setting, our results suggest that scientists could concentrate their time and
efforts in performing research and competing for preparing high-quality submissions.
Reviewing could be considered a side-activity for brilliant scientists, preferentially allo-
cated to less successful scientists. If so, reviewing would not require a symmetrically high
effort to compensate the lack of rigour of submitted manuscripts, thus determining a
functional division of academic labour (Righi and Taka´cs 2017).
However, considering that scientists are embedded in an institutional setting that
determines priorities, norms and (positive/negative) incentives, such a division of labour
can even be dysfunctional. For instance, when the institutional environment promotes
scientific excellence (e.g., publishing in top journals in a stratified publication market),
competition for publication could deteriorate resources allocated to reviewing to such a
level as to impede peer review to recognise high-quality submissions. This could depress
the average quality of published research (Righi and Taka´cs 2017). In this case, a setting
where not only top-tier publications are rewarded could allow scientists to pursue a more
balanced resource allocation between publishing and reviewing (Squazzoni and Gandelli
2012, 2013; Bianchi and Squazzoni 2016). This would also make the emergence of an
efficient self-organized ‘‘division of scientific labour’’ possible in that a high-class of top
scientists could primarily concentrate their efforts on research, while a larger group would
be more engaged in reviewing without depressing the average quality of publications
(Kovanis et al. 2016).
Furthermore, our results suggest that an even better performance could be obtained if
scientists internalised reciprocity norms that would signal reviewing as a means to indi-
rectly reward previous cooperation by referees (Squazzoni et al. 2013). In this case, even a
competitive focus on excellence triggered by the institutional context would find a sus-
tainable equilibrium between bias minimisation, high-quality research and fairness of peer
review. Here, even a certain amount of over-confidence could be instrumental in promoting
high-quality publication. However, our simulations suggest that if competition were only
mildly promoted, reciprocating scientists could disproportionately concentrate resources
on reviewing, therefore generating a very fair system, yet selecting very low-quality sci-
entific publications.
In conclusion, although highly abstract, our model helped us to understand the interplay
of contexts and behaviour in peer review and explore different trade-offs in scientists’
resource allocation (Righi and Taka´cs 2017). Obviously, empirical data would be neces-
sary to verify our results. However, finding data that allow us to estimate these trade-offs at
the individual level at a sufficient scale to map the process comprehensively is almost
impossible. Finally, initiatives to improve reviewer recognition and rewarding more ref-
erees, on which there is vivid debate today, could help to promote more positive equilibria
between research and reviewing and promote more shared reciprocity among scientists
(Kovanis et al. 2017; Ross-Hellauer 2017; Tennant et al. 2017).
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Appendix
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity analysis of evaluation bias with different values of T. We
also tested the robustness of our results while varying the initial distribution of Ri and ei.
Fig. 2 Evaluation bias across different T values, initial resource distribution and initial effort distribution.
a Selfish—no comparison, b equaliser—no comparison, c reciprocating—no comparison, d equaliser—
strive for publication, e reciprocating—strive for publication, f equaliser—strive for excellence,
g reciprocating—strive for excellence
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Figure 3 shows the sensitivity analysis of publication quality with different values of
T. We also tested the robustness of our results by varying the initial distribution of Ri and
ei.
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity analysis of top quality with different values of T. We
also tested the robustness of our results by varying the initial distribution of Ri and ei.
Fig. 3 Publication quality across different T values, initial resource distribution and initial effort
distribution. a Selfish—no comparison, b equaliser—no comparison, c reciprocating—no comparison,
d equaliser—strive for publication, e reciprocating—strive for publication, f equaliser—strive for
excellence, g reciprocating—strive for excellence
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